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ABSTRACT
In 2015, Eyal proposed the first game-theoretical model for
analyzing the equilibrium of blockchain pooling: when the
blockchain pools are abstracted as a non-cooperative game,
two pools can reach a Nash equilibrium with a closed-form
formula; Moreover, an arbitrary number of pools still ex-
hibit an equilibrium as long as the pools have an equal num-
ber of miners. Nevertheless, whether an equilibrium exists
for three or more pools of distinct sizes remains an open
problem. To this end, this paper studies the equilibrium in a
blockchain of arbitrary pools. First, we show that the equilib-
rium among q identical pools, coinciding the result demon-
strated by Eyal through game theory, can be constructed
using a topological approach. Second, if the pools are of dif-
ferent size, we show that (i) if the blockchain’s pools exhibit
two distinct sizes, an equilibrium can be reached, and (ii) if
the blockchain has at least three distinct pool sizes, there
does not exist an equilibrium.
KEYWORDS
Blockchains;Nash equilibrium; Point-set topology;Algebraic
topology; Distributed computing; Solvability
1 INTRODUCTION
In 2015, Eyal [1] proposed the first game-theoretical model
for analyzing the equilibrium of blockchain pooling: when
the blockchain pools are abstracted as a non-cooperative
game, two pools can reach a Nash equilibrium with a closed-
form formula.Moreover, the pioneeringwork further proved
that an arbitrary number of pools still exhibit an equilib-
rium as long as the pools have an equal number of miners.
Whether an equilibrium exists for three or more pools of
distinct sizes, however, remains an open problem.
This paper studies the equilibrium in a blockchain of arbi-
trary pools: the number of pools might be larger than three,
and each of these pools might admit any number of min-
ers: the pools might be of different sizes, pair-wisely. The
motivation of this study is that relaxing the constraints on
the number of pools and their size-equality would better
portrait the real-world scenarios: evidently, all production
blockchain systems comprise more than two pools whose
sizes are barely equal.
We approach this problem through a methodology rather
than game theory though; instead, we go for a lower-level
mathematical technique—topology. This choice of method-
ology is purely technical: we found that the framework and
tools in topology are more flexible and arguably, more pow-
erful. Although there aremultiple branches of topology, such
as point-set topology and algebraic topology, their essence
is very similar: it is all about the relationship among the ele-
ments of a set and the derived topological properties thereof.
In this sense, although in the remainder of this paper we in-
termingle the techniques from both point-set topology and
algebraic topology, the intrinsic rationale never diverges—
again, it is all about the discussion on the relationship among,
this time, the miners within and across blockchain pools.
From a technical perspective, this paperwill first (§3) show
that the equilibrium among q identical pools, coinciding the
result demonstrated by [1] through game theory, can be con-
structed using a topological approach. Instead of using game
theory as a black box in a non-cooperative game, we show
that the equilibriummust exist even if we treat the blockchain
pools in a coalitional game. The key insight of our approach,
and also the approaches of other results of this paper, lies
at the topological invariant on the connectivity of topologi-
cal objects. This result demonstrates the power of topology:
although an equilibrium, known as a core, of a coalitional
game, might not exist, a topological-approach can speak of
more—an equilibrium does exist for this problem.
The second part of this paper’s technical contribution (§4)
is to tackle a more challenging problem in blockchain pool-
ing, where the pools are not equal in size. Through various
point-set-topological and algebraic-topological tools, along
with a reduction to a well-known k-set-agreement problem
in solvability, we show that (i) if the blockchain’s pools ex-
hibit two distinct sizes, an equilibrium can be reached, and
(ii) if the blockchain has at least three distinct pool sizes,
there does not exist an equilibrium. Once again, the results
demonstrate the power of topological methods for this prob-
lem: we can now decide whether an equilibrium exists for
an arbitrary set of pools—stronger than saying “an equilib-
rium might not exist."
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2 BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Blockchain Pools
Due to the severe competition for block mining, blockchain
miners form coalitions, or pools, to amortize the cost. The
point is to share the reward and transaction fee with fel-
low miners in the same pool in a more continuous manner
rather than risking a long period of a solo mining before get-
ting anything back, although the latter indicating a high re-
ward with a probability. The motivation of pooling together
in blockchains is well-justified and at goodwill; In a perfect
world, every pool and miner is a good citizen and behaves
as expected.
However, in the real world, there is nothing preventing
one or more pools from sending a spy miner over to other
pools. The rationale is also justifiable as follows: if the spy
can hide its local mining results, then the target pool will be
less competitive and has a lower chance of winning the race
of mining blocks. There is a downside of this attack, how-
ever: the pool which sends out spies is also less competitive
in the sense that its own computational power is cut down.
It is then not hard to see that such a dilemma might signifi-
cantly affect the pooling strategies, for example, whether to
launch the infiltrating attack, if so, what is the percentage
of computation power should be devoted to the attack, and
so on.
It then becomes a natural question to ask whether such
attacks among pools might reach a stable status: pools will
not launch more attacks or withdraw existing attacks—no
more spies moving around, which is called an equilibrium.
One of the pioneering works for this matter appeared in [1],
which shows: (i) no-attack is not an equilibrium: all pools
are rational and would not miss the opportunity to legally
impair other pools; (ii) a blockchain of two pools does have
a Nash equilibrium; and (iii) a blockchain of q > 2 pools of
an equal number of miners also has an equilibrium.
2.2 Game Theory
One key question in game theory is whether there exists an
equilibrium among rational players who would not change
her decision even if the decision is sub-optimal—usually im-
plying that her utility is not maximal. The main reason for
not switching to a higher-return decision is due to the pos-
sibility of a “very bad” outcome. Quantitatively, the players
calculate the expectation—a weighted average over all the
possible decisions in the simplest form—and make their de-
cisions that might not be the absolutely highest-return one.
The well-known Nash equilibrium is one such decision,
or the so-called solution concept, in the literature of game
theory. Informally, theNash equilibrium has a two-foldmean-
ing. First, the existence of Nash equilibrium states that if an
individual player has a finite number of strategies, then there
must exist an equilibrium among a finite number of such
players. Second, the Nash equilibrium of multi-player deci-
sions, as any other solution concepts of equilibrium, once
reached, would not change unless the assumptions are in-
validated. One strong assumption of Nash equilibrium is the
isolation of individual players: the players in the game will
simply behave as an entity, and no collaboration is allowed.
This assumption covers many interesting problems, but ob-
viously, not all. The problems targeted by Nash equilibrium
and its variant are called non-cooperative games.
When players are allowed to collaborate, i.e., to form coali-
tions to work together for higher utility returns, the game
then becomes a cooperative game, or better known as a coali-
tional game in the literature of game theory. Although coali-
tional games share very similar objectives and challenges
as non-cooperative games, the solution concepts look quite
different. For instance, the equilibrium counterpart in coali-
tional games is called a core, which does not always exist.
Some approximations to the core do exist, such as the bar-
gaining set, but in general, a coalitional game’s equilibrium
point, from existence to calculation, remains a very chal-
lenging problem.
2.3 Point-Set Topology
We review the basics in point-set topology in this section.
In the literature, it is also called general topology. Point-set
topology focuses on the abstraction of relationships among
elements in a set, without constraints about the correspond-
ing geometric objects. Because the relationships are all de-
fined, in an axiomatic manner, over the abstraction of el-
ements and sets, the properties and theorems are applied
to other branches of topology. A detailed introduction to
point-set topology can be found in textbooks such as [7].
The definitions we list below are by no means exhaustive;
we only sketch the ones that will be used in later chapters.
We assume the readers are familiar with basic set-theoretical
terms.
• Topological Space. Let S be a set. A set T of subsets of
S is called a topology of S as long as ∅ ∈ T and S ∈
T . The tuple (T , S) is called the topological space of
S . If T = {∅, S}, then T is called a trivial topology
of S . If the context is clear, we also call the topology
induced by S topology S .
• Discrete Topological Space. Let T be a topology of set
S . If for any subset S ′ ⊆ S we have S ′ ∈ T , then T
is called a discrete topology of S . Essentially, all the
elements in S are singleton elements in T ; also, any
combination of those singleton elements are also in
T .
• Open Set. Let T be a topology of S . Any element
O ∈ T is called an open set. The complement set
S \O is called a closed set.
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• Continuous Functions. Let f be a function from topol-
ogy A to topology B, f : A → B. We call f a con-
tinuous function if for every open set O ′ ∈ B, there
exists an open set O ∈ A such that f (O) = O ′.
• Injective, Surjective, and Bijective Functions. Let f be
a function from domain set A to image set B, f :
A→ B. If for any a ∈ A, a′ ∈ A, and a , a′, we have
f (a) , f (a′), then f is injective. If for every b ∈ B,
there is an element a ∈ A such that f (a) = b, then
f is surjective. If f is both injective and surjective,
then f is bijective.
• Homeomorphism. Let f be a function from topology
A to topology B, f : A → B. If f is both bijective
and continuous, then f is called a homeomorphism
ofA and B, and A is called homeomophic to B.
2.4 Algebraic Topology
In contrast to point-set topology, algebraic topology is more
concerned with the underlying geometric realizations and
algebraic structures. One approach to study the geometric
objects is to decompose them into smaller pieces, the so-
called triangulation, which does not necessarily break the
object down into triangles but cells. If we restrict the shape
of a cell to a polyhedron, i.e., only points and lines, then the
geometric object can be depicted as a discrete approxima-
tion. Each of these polyhedron cells is then called a simplex,
and the whole object is called a simplicial complex. It turns
out that these concepts can also be defined in a set-theoretic
context, as we will see shortly. A delicate and beautiful the-
ory, namely algebraic topology, has been built upon these
simple yet powerful definitions, and this is where we start
our review. As point-set topology, we only list the concepts
and notations of algebraic topology that will be used in later
chapters of this paper; a more complete and rigorous review
of algebraic topology can be found in textbooks such as [6].
• Simplicial Complex, Simplex. Let S be a set. Each el-
ement v ∈ S is called a vertex. A simplicial complex
C is a set of subsets of S if (i) all the vertices are sin-
gleton elements in C and (ii) for every X ∈ C, all
subsets of X are also in C. Each element σ ∈ C is
called a simplex. In the remaining of the paper, we
call a simplicial complex a complex if no ambiguity
may arise.
• Face, Proper Face, Facet. A face τ of simplex σ if τ ⊆
σ . A proper face τ of simplex σ if τ ⊂ σ . A simplex
σ is a facet of a complex C if σ is not a proper face
of any other simplices in C.
• Vertex Map. Give two complexes A and B, a vertex
map is a function φ : V (A) → V (B), where V (·)
returns the set of vertices. Note that we do not im-
pose any additional properties of the functionφ; For
example, it is allowed to map two distinct vertices
from A to the same vertex in B.
• Simplicial Map. A vertex map φ fromV (A) to V (B)
is called a simplicial map it carries any simplex from
A to a simplex in B. That is, if {a0, . . . ,an} is a sim-
plex in A, then {φ(a0), . . . ,φ(an)} is a simplex in
B.
• Carrier Map. A carrier map Φ maps each simplex in
complexA to a subset of complex B, usually called
a subcomplex all of which constitute a powerset de-
noted 2B . To this end, the carrier map is often writ-
ten as Φ : A → 2B .
• Dimension of Simplices and Complexes (dim). The di-
mension of a simplex σ is defined as the number of its
vertices minus 1: dim(σ ) = |σ | − 1. The reason why
this is so defined is due to the geometric intuition:
a two-vertex simplex can be geometrically viewed
as a 1-dimensional line segment, a three-vertex sim-
plex can be geometrically viewed as a 2-dimensional
triangle, and so on. The dimension of a complex C is
defined as the dimension of the highest-dimensional
simplices in the complex. That is, dim(C) = sup{dim(σ ) :
σ ∈ C}.
• Skeleton of Complexes (skelk ). A k-skeleton of com-
plex C is a set of simplices in C whose dimension is
up to k . That is, skelkC = {σ ∈ C : dim(σ ) ≤ k}.
Following this definition, the vertices of a complex
is just its 0-skeleton: V (C) = skel0C.
• Connectivity. This is one of the most important topo-
logical properties in the sense that two topological
spaces cannot be equivalent (i.e., homeomorphic) if
they exhibit different levels of connectivity. Themost
widely-used property, also the one used in later chap-
ters of this paper, is called path-connected, which
has a similar definition as graph theory. A complex
C is called path-connected if any two vertices can
be connected through a sequence of 1-dimensional
simplices. If the context is clear, we simply call a
complex connected if it is path-connected. Strictly
speaking, path-connectivity is at the degree 0 of the
connectivity spectrum, namely 0-connectivity. There
is higher-degree connectivity: a k-connectivity indi-
cates that a (k + 1)-dimensional ball can be contin-
uously mapped to the complex—there is no (k + 1)-
dimensional “holes” in the complex.
• Subdivision (div). Subdivision refers to finer decom-
position of a given simplex, denoted div(·), such
that a new set of simplices are generated, and all
of them constitute a new complex. Two of the most
popular subdivisions are Barycentric subdivision and
Chromatic subdivision. Barycentric subdivision (Bary(·))
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simply takes the Barycentric center of a specific lower-
dimensional skeleton, joins the center to existing
vertices, and repeats this procedure on all levels of
skeletons. Chromatic subdivision (Ch(·)) extends the
Barycentric subdivision by introducing joint-centers
such that the new vertices cannot directly share a
lower-dimensional simplex with existing vertices, which
turns to be very useful in tasks related to graph col-
oring.
• Joining Complexes (*). In addition to dividing exist-
ing simplices, we are also able to “glue” together ex-
isting complexes through joining. Given two com-
plexesA andB, the joining of two is a new complex
with all the simplices from A and B. Formally, we
sayA∗B = {σ ∪τ : σ ∈ A, τ ∈ B}. This definition
can be extended to simplices as well; for example,
the join of a vertex and a complex is a new complex
with the original vertex, the original complex, and
all the edges (i.e., 1-dimensional simplices) between
the original vertex and every vertex of the original
complex.
3 EQUILIBRIUM OF EQUAL POOLS
3.1 Problem Formulation
Assume there are q pools, where q ∈ Z+, q ≥ 2. We call the
size Two pools are said to be equal if they have the same
number of nodes, namely, size. Let the size of each pool be
(n + 1), n ∈ Z+, n ≥ 1. Each of q pools is a thus a n-simplex,
and the input complexI hasq disconnectedn-simplices, i.e.,
components: there is no 1- or higher-dimensional simplex
among any pair of these components. These n-simplices are
disconnected from each other because they know nothing
about others.
Definition 3.1 (Vertex in I). Each vertex v in I is a tuple
(p
j
i ,⊥), where p
j
i denotes the i-th pool’s j-th node (miner)
and⊥ denotes logical false—the miner does not join another
pool other than i . Evidently, we have 1 ≤ i ≤ q and 0 ≤ j ≤
n.
The output complex is defined as follows. Each vertex v
in O is a tuple (p ji ,k), where p
j
i is the same as Def. 3.1 and k
denotes the k-th pool, 1 ≤ k ≤ q. Note that, by such defini-
tion, even if p ji does not change its originally assigned pool,
the vertex will still change the value from ⊥ to k .
Definition 3.2 (Auxiliary Operations on Vertices). By con-
vention, we define two auxiliary operations to return the
process identities and their assignments:
name(v) = p
j
i ,
view(v) = k .
Furthermore, we define the following functions to return
the miner’s pool and index information:
pool(v) = i,
index(v) = j .
Because our goal is to find an equilibrium, each node p ji
cannot be intersected by two ormore simplices in O. That is,
if (p ji ,k) ∈ σ ∈ O and (p
j
i ,k) ∈ τ ∈ O, then σ = τ . It follows
that the output complex O is a disconnected complex of N -
simplices where N = q · (n + 1) − 1. For any N -simplex in
σ ∈ O, we have
{index(v) : v ∈ σ } = [n],
where [n] denotes the set {0, . . . ,n}. Similarly, we have
{view(v) : v ∈ σ } = [q].
Now we are ready to define the carrier map ∆ from com-
plex I to O, that is, ∆ : I → 2O . Essentially, ∆ “deforms”
a simplex σ ∈ I into one possible simplex in a subset of O,
i.e., a subcomplex S ⊆ O in a monotonic way. By monotinic,
we require that adding more vertices or higher-dimensional
simplices into σ would only enlarge the subcomplex S. If
we can successfully construct a carrier map ∆, or prove that
such carrier map exists, then we are guaranteed the exis-
tence of an equilibrium.
The problem of assigning pools to miners is thus repre-
sented as a triple (I,O,∆). In the remainder of this section,
we will discuss how to find or construct ∆, if it exists.
3.2 Methodology Overview
In the literature of algebraic topology, we usually face two
types of problems: (i) To demonstrate that two topological
spaces are “equivalent” up to continuous deformation—retaining
the topological properties or the so-called topological invari-
ant, and (ii) To prove that two topological spaces cannot be
equivalent. For the first type of problem, we can either con-
struct an explicit continuous function to map from the first
space to the other or show that both spaces are homeomor-
phic in the sense that their underlying algebraic structures
(e.g., groups, fields) are homomorphic. For the second type
of problem, we are left with the only option of showing that
the underlying algebraic structures are not homomorphic.
Our strategy to find the equilibrium for equal pools is as
follows.
(1) We will construct a continuous function, i.e., a sim-
plicial map φ from a specific n-simplex σ ∈ I to a
N -simplex τ ∈ O. That is, φ : I → O.
(2) We will show that all the n-simplices in I are home-
omorphic, such that the simplicial map is applicable
to all the simplices in I.
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(3) Finally, we will prove that for any σ ∈ I, the cor-
responding simplices in O constitute a connected
subcomplex: ⋃
σ ∈I
φ(σ ) ⊆ O.
3.3 Simplicial Map from I to O
First, wewill rephrase thewell-known results of game-theoretic
blockchains in the context of algebraic topology. Eyal [1]
showed that a no-attack strategy is not a Nash equilibrium
in blockchain pools. That is to say, in the output complex
O, a connected component, which is itself a simplex, can-
not have all of its nodes staying in their originally assigned
pool. We thus have our first constraint on the simplices in
O, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3. For any simplex τ ∈ O, there exists a vertex
v ∈ τ such that name(v) = p
j
i and view(v) , i .
Proof. The result is a straightforward implication of the
result in [1]. More specifically, this can be easily verified by
contradiction. If every vertexv ∈ τ satisfy the following two
conditions: name(v) = p ji and view(v) = i , then we know
that no node joins another pool in the final pool assignment.
However, this is not possible because a “stay-at-pool” strat-
egy is not a Nash equilibrium1 according to [1], leading to a
contradiction. 
Recall that a simplicial map is an extended vertex map:
not only does the map apply to 0-simplices (i.e., vertices),
but also to any k-simplices, 0 ≤ k ≤ n. That is, we need
to show that there exists a map from I to O such that any
simplex of dimension d has a corresponding d-dimensional
simplex in O. Formally, we will have the following result.
Lemma 3.4. There exists a simplicial map from I to O.
Proof. We prove this lemma by constructing a map by
induction. We will first show that a vertex map exists. Then,
we will assume such a map exists for dimension k , and fi-
nally, show that a newmap exists for dimension (k+1) based
on the k-dimensional map.
We define a map φ0 : skel0I → skel0O as follows. Re-
call that skelk indicates the set of simplices of dimension of
up to k; therefore, skel0C simply represents the set of ver-
tices of complex C. Recall that the dimension of O is much
larger that of I:
dim(O) = N = q · (n + 1) − 1 > n = dim(I).
1Indeed, here we assume a noncooperative game among individual min-
ers. A more general and harder problem is to consider the coalition among
the miners in the same pool, essentially forming a coalitional game model.
We will discuss solution concepts and solvability challenges of coalitional
pooling strategies in §4.
Therefore, it is essential for φ0 to map q simplices from I
to the same simplex in O. More specifically, we need to con-
struct the map for all the vertices of q simplices in I. With-
out loss of generality, in the following we will work on the
0-th n-simplex, namely σ0, such that φ0(skel0σ0) ∈ O.
Recall that by definition, the output complexO comprises
N -simplices with all the possible pool assignments as long
as the miners are distinct. We define the simplicial map φ0 :
σ 7→ τ based on the following two conditions:
(1) {name(u) : u ∈ σ } = {name(v) : v ∈ τ }
(2) view(u) = (view(v) + 1) mod q
Condition (1) ensures that the simplicial map φ is name pre-
serving, a requirement of any protocol that can solve the
problem. Condition (2) guarantees that the resulting simplex
is valid, according to Lemma 3.3. Intuitively, all the vertices
in σ0 move the “next” pool in the loop of q simplices. Note
that this map is well-defined because all the pools are of
equal size, as part of the assumption. It turns out that other
simplicial maps φk , 1 ≤ k < q can be similarly constructed
as φ0, and they are all well-defined due to the equal cardi-
nality of pools. Therefore, ∀σk , 0 ≤ k < q, we can always
use φ0 to map all the vertices of q simplices into the same
simplex in O. We have thus successfully built the base for
the induction, i.e., dim(skel0I) = 0.
It remains to show that higher-dimensional faces ofσ ∈ I
and τ ∈ O can also be mapped through φ. Suppose we have
found a simplicial map φd−1 : skel
d−1σ → skeld−1τ , 1 ≤
d ≤ n, which is indeed the case for 0-dimension as shown
above, we will need to show a d-dimensional varient of the
simplical mapφd can map skel
dσ to skeldτ . Let σ and τ be
two (d − 1)-dimensional simplices in I and O, respectively.
Because d − 1 < dim(I) = n < dim(O) = N , there must
exist two vertices u ∈ I and v ∈ O, respectively, such that
u < σ and v < τ . We construct a d-dimensional simplex σ ′
as the joining ofu and σ , and do that forv and τ in a similar
fashion:
σ ′ = {u} ∗ σ ,
τ ′ = {v} ∗ τ .
Recall that ∗ denotes the join operation between two sim-
plices. Evidently, wewill haveσ ′ ∈ skeldI andτ ′ ∈ skeldO,
for which the map φd can be applied.
Finally, we define φ as the composition of a series of join
operations and lower-dimensional maps (φ0, . . . ,φn−1). By
construction, φ is a simplicial map from I to O. 
Intuitively speaking, Protocol 3.4 states that it is possible
to merge multiple initial pool-local views into a coherent
view in the final pool assignment. Next, we will show that
this property is invariant as long as the pools are kept equal
in the input.
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3.4 Homeomorphic Simplices in I
In this section, we will show that all the n-simplices in I are
homeomorphic, meaning that all these components are es-
sentially equivalent in the sense that one component can de-
form into another with continuous functions. This property
will be crucial when we prove that more than one equilib-
rium must exist in an equal-pool blockchain network later
in §3.6. The remainder of this section will demonstrate that
ifI is an equal-pool blockchainnetwork, then any two pools
are homeomorphic. Formally, we will prove the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.5. Suppose I is an equal-pool blockchain’s input
complex. For any σ , τ ∈ I, σ and τ are homeomorphic.
Proof. Here we overuse the Greek letters, e.g., σ and τ ,
to represent both the simplices and topological spaces. In
the latter case, the discrete space induced by the vertices of
the simplex. That is, topological space σ consists of all the
subsets of vertices in σ :
Tσ = 2
skel0σ
.
If the context is clear, we simply write σ to indicate its topo-
logical space Tσ .
We need to show that there is a function between two
topological spaces, i.e., f : σ → τ , such that:
(1) f is bijective
(2) f is continuous
(3) f −1 is continuous
Let U ⊆ σ be any subset. Denote its cardinality |U | =
m + 1, −1 ≤ m ≤ n, thenU can be rewritten as
U = {u0, . . . ,um},
where U = ∅ if m < 0. For each element u ∈ U , u is a
vertex defined in Def. 3.1. Recall that index(u) returns the
local index of vertex u in the pool identified by pool(u). We
extend the definition of index on a single vertex defined in
Def. 3.2 to a set:
index(U ) = {index(u) : u ∈ U }.
Evidently, since all pools are equal in size by assumption,
for any index(U ), we can always have a index(V ), where
V ⊆ τ , such that index(V ) = index(U ). This is exactly the
condition based on which we define f :
f : U 7→ V iff index(U ) = index(V ).
Now, we need to verify that f defined above is bijective and
continuous in both directions.
To show that f is bijective, we need to show that f is
both injective and surjective. For any two subsets of σ , U1
and U2, U1 , U2. Without loss of generality, suppose u ∈ U1
and u < U2. Then, we will have a vertex v ∈ V1 = f (U1)
such that index(v) = index(u). Since u < U2, we know
v < V2 = F (U2), meaning that V1 , V 2. Therefore, we just
show:
U1 , U2 =⇒ f (U1) , f (U2),
thus f is injective. Suppose V is any subset of τ , we will
show that there must be a domain U ∈ σ whose image
comprises V—if this is true, then f is surjective. This can
be trivially verified: because pools are all equal and the min-
ers within each pool are following the same naming conven-
tion (cf. Def. 3.2), then for any set of indices index(V ), there
must be a subset U ⊆ σ such that index(U ) = index(V ),
rendering f a surjective function. Since f is both injective
and surjective, we know f is a bijective function.
Next, we show that f is a continuous function. That is
to say, for any open set V ⊆ τ , we have an open set U ⊆ σ
such that f (U ) = V . Recall that an open set is defined as any
subset included in the topological space. A simplex, by defi-
nition, has all of its subsets as open sets2 in the induced dis-
crete topological space. The continuity property can be sim-
ilarly demonstrated as we proved the covering property (i.e.,
f is surjective) before. The indices of open setV is index(V ).
Because pools are all equal and following the same naming
convention, there must be an open set U ⊆ σ such that
index(U ) = index(V ).
Finally, we need to show that the inverse function f −1 :
V → U is also continuous. We skip the detailed proof here
because it follows exactly the same reasoning as we proved
the continuity of f : U → V .
Given that f is both bijective and continuous, and f −1 is
also continuous, we have found a homeomorphim f for σ
and τ . Since both σ and τ are arbitrary simplices of I, we
conclude that all simplices in I are homeomorphic. 
3.5 Connected Subcomplex in O
In the previous two subsections, we have shown that (i) there
exists a simplicial map from the input complex to the out-
put complex and (ii) all the simplices in the input complex
are homeomorphic. The last piece for our main theorem,
which will be presented in §3.6, is demonstrating that the
mapped simplices in the output complex indeed constitute
a connected subcomplex. Formally, we need to prove the fol-
lowing lemma.
Lemma 3.6. Let φ : I → O be the simplicial map defined
in Lemma 3.4. We define the union of the mapped simplices as
S:
S =
⋃
σ ∈I
φ(σ ),
then S ⊆ O and S is connected.
2In topology, these open sets are also closed sets since they are all comple-
mentary to the open sets.We do not explicitly define closed sets in themain
text since we do not need closed sets in our proofs.
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Proof. The first part of the proof is trivial. We need to
show that for any face τ ∈ S, then τ ∈ O. Because S is
a union of φ(σ ), it is suffice to show that φ(σ ) ∈ O. This
is evidently true because that is how φ is constructed in
Lemma 3.4.
The second part, the connectedness ofS, needsmorework,
though. Recall that φ is a composition of n + 1 maps each of
which corresponds to a specific dimension k , 0 ≤ k ≤ n.
Therefore, by construction, each φ(σ ) is (n − 1) connected:
we can always have a n-dimensional disk that is homeomor-
phic to φ(σ ). It remains to show that there is at least one
path connecting two simplices in S. We will prove this by
contradiction.
Suppose there does not exist a path between two sim-
plices τ1 ∈ S and τ2 ∈ S. Then τ1 and τ2 cannot coexist in
the same simplex of O because all the simplices in O are N -
dimensional: missing a path between τ1 and τ2 would have
disqualified any of the two serving in the same simplex in
O. Let φ(σ1) = τ1 and φ(σ2) = τ2. It follows that σ1 and σ2
are not mapped into the same simplex in O by φ. However,
every φ guarantees that
{name(u) : u ∈ σ } = {name(v) : v ∈ τ },
as shown in Lemma 3.4. This means that a fixed φ must map
all theq simplices inI into the sameN -dimensional simplex
in O, leading to a contradiction. 
3.6 Equilibrium of Equal-Pool Blockchains
We are now ready to state the main result for equal-pool
blockchains. Specifically, we will show that there is a pro-
tocol to continuously transform the input complex into the
output complex.
Theorem 3.7. If all blockchain pools are equal, then there
exist protocols to allow all miners reach equilibrium.
Proof. By Lemma 3.4, the simplicial map φ maps sim-
plices {σ1, . . . ,σq} in I into the same simplex τ in O. How-
ever, because σi ’s are disconnected to each other, 1 ≤ i ≤ q,
the corresponding topological space cannot continuously
deform to the topological space induced by τ . That is, there
does not exist a protocol induced by φ for miners to reach
equilibrium.
To fix the disconnected components, we can limit φ to a
subset of its domain—a specific simplex in I. Without loss
of generality, let the specific simplex be the first one out of
the q simplices σ1:
π = φ |σ1 .
According to Lemma 3.5, all σi , 1 ≤ i ≤ q are homeomor-
phic. Therefore, up the continuous transformation, φ can be
represented by q times of π :
πq(σ1) = φ(σ ),
where
πq(·) = π ◦ . . . ◦ π︸       ︷︷       ︸
q
(·).
Note thatσ1 is connected by definition, which is an-dimensional
simplex. Now, we have a map π : σ1 → O. By Lemma 3.6,
we know π (σ1) ∈ S ⊆ O is connected. Therefore, both the
domain and image sets of π are connected. Because π is de-
duced from φ that is a simplicial map, π must be a simplicial
map as well. A simplicial map between two connected com-
plexes is obviously continuous. Thus a protocol must exist
to transform the input complex into the output complex. 
Theorem 3.7 and its proof shows that for any blockchain
with equal pools, there are at least q equilibria because π
can be defined on up to q distinct simplices in I. This is a
stronger result than [1] in the sense that the lower bound of
the number of equilibria is elevated from one to q. Nonethe-
less, it is arguable that equal pools might not be a practical
assumption in real-world blockchain practices. To that end,
we will switch our focus on the pooling strategies where the
sizes are arbitrary.
4 SOLVABILITY OF ARBITRARY POOLS
If we relax the requirement of equal pools in blockchains,
we cannot any more reason about the equilibrium following
the techniques in §3: Lemma 3.5 becomes invalid. To see this,
consider one of the conditions for a homeomorphism f ; f
must be bijective between σ and τ . However, if not all pools
have the same size, then there must be two simplices σ and
τ such that:
|skel0σ | , |skel0τ |.
Therefore, there cannot exist a bijective function between
two sets of different cardinalities. In the remainder of this
section, wewill show that a general blockchain-poolingprob-
lem does not have an equilibrium. As before, we start with
the problem formulation.
4.1 Problem Formulation
Assume there areq pools, whereq ∈ Z+,q ≥ 2. Let {σ1, . . . ,σq}
denote such q pools. At least two pools have distinct num-
bers of miners. Without loss of generality, let |σ1 | , |σ2 |.
In general, we pose no requirement on the equality of car-
dinality of other pools. To start with an easier problem, we
assume
|σ1 | = n + 1 >m + 1 = |σk |, 2 ≤ k ≤ q.
That is, we have onen-simplex and (q−1) lower-dimensional
m-simplices in the blockchain pools. Moreover, all of these
q simplices are disconnected pair-wise.
Note that although this condition makes the problem eas-
ier than the original one, the condition is strong enough to
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invalidate Lemma 3.5. Also, if we can show that this “eas-
ier” problem does not have an equilibrium, neither does the
original problem.
As the equal-pool problem, each vertex v in I is a tuple
(p
j
i ,⊥), where p
j
i denotes the i-th pool’s j-th node (miner)
and⊥ denotes logical false—the miner does not join another
pool other than i . Evidently, we have 1 ≤ i ≤ q and 0 ≤ j ≤
n.
The output complex is defined similarly. Each vertex v in
O is a tuple (p ji ,k), where p
j
i is the same as input complex
and k denotes the k-th pool, 1 ≤ k ≤ q. Note that, by such
definition, even if p ji does not change its originally assigned
pool, the vertex will still change the value from ⊥ to k .
Because we are concernedwith an equilibrium, each node
p
j
i cannot be intersected by two ormore simplices in O. That
is, if (p ji ,k) ∈ σ ∈ O and (p
j
i ,k) ∈ τ ∈ O, then σ = τ . It fol-
lows that the output complex O is a disconnected complex
of N -simplices where N = n + (q − 1) · (m + 1). For any
N -simplex in σ ∈ O, we have
{view(v) : v ∈ σ } = [q].
However, the index(·)would look different for σ1 and other
simplices:
{index(σx )} =
{
[n], x = 1,
[m], otherwise.
We can define the carrier map ∆ from complex I to O,
similarly to the equal-pool counterpart. Themonotonic prop-
erty of ∆ still holds in this arbitrary-pool problem. We will
show that such ∆ cannot exist due to some topological in-
variant in the remainder of this section.
4.2 Methodology Overview
Our approach to demonstrate that an equilibrium does not
exist is built upon the findings in the equal-pool counterpart
presented in §3. Specifically, we will split the q simplices in
the input complexI into two subcomplexes: (i) The first sub-
complex I1 consists of only one simplex σ1; (ii) The second
subcomplex I2 consists of (q − 1)m-simplices: {σ2, . . . ,σq}.
Then, according to Theorem 3.7,I2 can lead to at least (q−1)
equilibria, and we can rewrite the simplicial maps with a
power of limited maps. It remains to show that the extended
problem with I = I1∪I2 has no way to be mapped to a con-
nected simplex in O.
The main technique we use to demonstrate the impossi-
bility is reduction. That is, we reduce a well-known prob-
lem, the k-set agreement problem, whose solution does not
exist for certain conditions that are satisfied by the equilib-
rium of an arbitrary-pool blockchain. Specifically, we will
show that we can “simulate” the execution of thek-set agree-
ment procedure by calling the operations in an arbitrary-
pool blockchain. Indeed, if we are able to do so, that means
wewould be able to solve thek-set agreement problem,which
is not possible. As a result, a protocol for reaching equilib-
rium in an arbitrary-pool network cannot exist.
4.3 Binary Partition: Topology of I1 and I2
We start our analysis with a simpler problem where only
one simplex σ1 has a different dimension than other q − 1
simplices in the input complex. Without loss of generality,
we assume I = I1 ∪ I2, and I1 = {σ1} and I2 = {σk :
2 ≤ k ≤ q}. Moreover, we assume dim(I1) = dim(σ1) = n,
dim(I2) = dim(σk ) =m, and n >m > 0.
We then construct limited simplicial maps π1 and π2 forI1
and I2, respectively. As before, we have the following equa-
tions: {
π1 = φ |σ1 ,
π2 = φ |σ2 = . . . = φ |σq .
As a result, themapped simplices can be similarly partitioned
into two parts O = O1 ∪ O2, where{
O1 = {π1(σ1)},
O2 = {π
q−1
2 (σ2)}.
We can write O2 as a power of π2 because all the σk , 2 ≤ k ≤
q are homeomorphic, as discussed before (cf. Lemma 3.5). It
turns out that we can expect two distinct sets of outcomes
in the output complex. The problem can now be represented
as a triple (I1∪I2,O1∪O2, π1◦π
q−1
2 ). We define an auxiliary
operation to return the partition of a specific simplex:
part(σ ) = i
such that dim(Ii ) = dim(σ ).
4.4 Ternary and Higher-order Partitions
We can naturally extend the partition techniques from two
to three or more. As we will show later in §4.5, for k ≥ 3,
all the k-set agreement problems are not decidable to have
a protocol. In the following, we assume 3 ≤ k ≤ q: there
are at least three distinct pools in terms of their sizes. Note
that we also require that the size of the largest pool is at
least k , i.e., n + 1 ≥ k , because otherwise there cannot exist
k distinct sizes
As in the case of binary partition, we can similarly define
I = I1∪I2 . . .∪Ik . We denote the cardinality, i.e., pool size,
of partitioned input complex as:
|I1 | = i1, |I2 | = i2, . . . , |Ik | = ik ,
where 1 ≤ x < y ≤ k =⇒ ix , iy , and require
k∑
κ=1
iκ = q, 1 ≤ κ ≤ k .
8
We use K to denote the set of pool sizes:
K = {i1, . . . , ik }.
It should be noted that k partitions of the input complex
do not change I’s topological properties. There are still q
components in I, each of which is a iκ -dimensional sim-
plex where iκ ∈ K . Furthermore, these q simplices are dis-
connected since the miners are in distinct pools and learn
nothing from other pools initially.
Having partitioned input complex based on their cardinal-
ities, we are ready to construct the output complex the corre-
sponding carrier maps. The partitioned simplicial maps for
k-distinct-pool are a natural extension to the binary parti-
tion we discuss in §4.3. Recall that all simplices are home-
ogeneous for a specific dimension iκ ∈ K . Therefore, the
compounded simplicial map can be written as
Oκ = π
iκ
κ (Iκ ), 1 ≤ κ ≤ k .
The task then can be expressed in the following triple:( ⋃
1≤κ≤k
Iκ ,
⋃
1≤κ≤k
Oκ ,
∏
1≤κ≤k
π iκκ
)
,
where we use multiplication to denote map composition:
∏
1≤κ≤k
π iκκ =
i1︷         ︸︸         ︷
π1 ◦ . . . ◦ π1 ◦ . . .
iκ︷          ︸︸          ︷
πκ ◦ . . . ◦ πκ ◦ . . .
ik︷         ︸︸         ︷
πk ◦ . . . ◦ πk︸                                                           ︷︷                                                           ︸
q
.
4.5 Relations with k-set Agreement
4.5.1 The k-set Agreement Problem. This section briefly
reviews the classical k-set agreement (KSA) problem and
its important decidability implications in the literature. In
the following sections, we will then use the KSA as a base
model and reduce it to the k-distinct-pool (KDP) problem
in blockchains. In the literature of computation theory, the
reduction is also called “simulation,” in the sense that a so-
lution protocol for the targeting problem can be wrapped
up as a solution for the base problem whose decidability is
already known.
Definition 4.1 (k-set agreement task.). A task ofk-set agree-
ment is a triple (I,O,∆), where the input I is comprised of
multiplen-simplices, the outputO is a complex ofk pairwise-
disconnected simplices each of which is connected by itself,
and the carrier map ∆mapping eachn-simplex inI to a sub-
complex in O. The initial views of vertices in I are taken
from a set V in , the final views of vertices in O are taken
from a setV out , whose cardinality isk , i.e., |V out | = k . While
the values in {view(σ ) : σ ∈ I} can be arbitrary, the out-
put complex is required to have exactly k simplices, each of
which takes a distinct value from V out .
Intuitively, KSA requires that the outcome can have up
to k distinct values for a group of (n + 1) members. It is a
generalization of the well-known consensus problem where
only one value can be chosen by the members. Indeed, the
consensus problem is a degenerate of KSA where k = 1. Al-
though KSA may seem easier than the consensus problem,
KSA is far from trivial under the regular computation mod-
els. A computation model is comprised of multiple facets,
such as failure models (e.g., crash failures, Byzantine fail-
ures), communication models (e.g., shared memory, message
passing), and timingmodels (e.g., synchronous processes, asyn-
chronous processes). The literature [2] showed that a model
is capable of solving ak-set agreement task onlywhenk ≤ 2.
To make this paper self-contained, we restate it here as the
following lemma.
Lemma 4.2 (KSA is solvable if k ≤ 2). Amodel is capable
of solving a k-set agreement task only if k ≤ 2.
Proof. See Theorem 5.6.14 in [2]. 
In the remainder of this section, we call a KSA problem
with k = 2 and k = 3 2SA and 3SA, respectively. Similarly,
we call a KDP problem with k = 2 and k = 3 2DP and 3DP,
respectively. In §4.5.2, we will show that a 2SA protocol can
reduce to a 2DP protocol, which means a blockchain with
two distinct pool sizes can reach an equilibrium. In §4.5.3,
we will show that a 3DP protocol can reduce to a 3SA proto-
col, meaning that a blockchain with three or more distinct
pool sizes does not have an equilibrium.
4.5.2 2SA reduces to 2DP. We first provide the basic con-
cepts and notations of computing theory in the context of
reduction, much of which was elaborated in [2].
A task is a problem to be solved. Examples of tasks include
finding the equilibrium of equal pools discussed in §3.1. For
completeness, we formally define the task here.
Definition 4.3 (Task). A task is a triple (I,O,∆), where I
is the input complex comprising all the possible input sim-
plices, O is the output complex comprising all the valid re-
sults represented by subcomplexes, and ∆ is a carrier map
between the input and output complexes and satisfies mono-
tonic property (i.e., closed on inclusion relationship):
∆ : I → 2O .
A protocol is an algorithm that solves the task, i.e., a pro-
cedure to reach a subset of the valid subcomplex in O. A
protocol also takes the same input complex I, and follow
the application-specific procedure to end up in a protocol
complex. The course of “following the application-specific
procedure” is abstracted also by a carrier map, namely Ξ.
Formally, a protocol is defined as follows.
Definition 4.4 (Protocol). A protocol is a triple (I,P,Ξ),
where I is the input complex, P is a complex representing
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all the possible final results according to the algorithm, and
Ξ is a carrier map:
Ξ : I → 2P .
We say that a protocol solves a task if the results in P are
encompassed by the expected outcomes O, as stated in the
following.
Definition 4.5. A protocol (I,P,Ξ) solves a task (I,O,∆
if there is a simplicial map δ
δ : P → O
such that for any simplex σ ∈ I the following is satisfied3:
δ (Ξ(σ )) ∈ ∆(σ ).
By convention, we also write δ ◦ Ξ ⊆ ∆, and δ is usually
called a decision map.
The relationship between protocols and tasks can be il-
lustrated in the following diagram in the sense of category
theory.
I P
O
Ξ
δ◦Ξ ⊆ ∆
δ
Having formalized the tasks and protocols, we are ready
to define a computationmodel, as follows. Intuitively, amodel
is just a collection of protocols that are applicable to a spe-
cific input complex.
Definition 4.6 (Computation Model). A computationmodel
on an complex I is a collection of triples (I,Pi ,Ξi ), i ≥ 0.
Now we are ready to portrait the relationship between
computation models.
Definition 4.7 (Model Reduction). Suppose there are two
computationmodels,R andV. By convention, they are called
real model and virtual model, respectively. Real model R is
said to reduce to virtual model V if every protocol for V im-
plies a protocol in R.
Usually, the reduction is implemented by a simulation of
one protocol in another, as defined below.
Definition 4.8 (Model Simulation). Let (I,Pr ,Ξr ) be a pro-
tocol for model R and (I,Pv ,Ξv ) be a protocol for model
V, respectively. We call V simulates R if there exists a sim-
plicial map Φ
Φ : Pr → Pv .
The map Φ is called a simulation between R and V. For any
σ ∈ I, we have
(Φ ◦ Ξr )(σ ) ⊆ Ξv (σ ).
3This property is called “carried by” in the literature. We here avoid using
this terminology for less confusion between carried by and carrier map.
From the perspective of category theory, the morphism
can be illustrated in the following diagram.
I Pr
Pv
Ξr
Φ◦Ξr ⊆ Ξv
Φ
We construct the simulation from 2SA to 2DP as follows.
Suppose the 2SA is represented by task (I,O,∆) and has a
protocol (I,P,Ξ). We know such a protocol must exist be-
cause when k = 2, the k-set-agreement problem turns to be
a graph-theoretical problem and there are many algorithms
(e.g., breadth-first, depth-first) to decide whether a pair of
vertices (u, v) has a path between ∆(u) and ∆(v).
For the 2SA task, assume there are N nodes in total, each
of which is a vertex in I. For its protocol (I,Pr ,Ξr ), ev-
ery time the protocol complex Pr grows into the next step,
the new complex is a subdivision of the previous complex.
There must exist a sufficiently large integer M such that
divMI = Pr ,
where Ξ = divM . Therefore, the protocol for 2SA can be
rewritten as a triple (I, divMI, divM ).
For each div operation, we map it to the swap of pool
assignment for a set of miners. We denote swapM the fol-
lowing operation:
pool(σ ) = (pool(σ ) + 1) mod q,
such that
index(σ ) = M mod |Ipart(σ ) |.
Intuitively, we restrict the miners to switch to a new pool in
a systematic manner. It should be clear that this manner is
only a subset of all the possible movements; the point is that
thesemovements are all allowed byPv , and any final assign-
ment can be achieved by this operation as long as M is suf-
ficiently large. As a result, the protocol for 2DP (I,Pv ,Ξv )
can be stated as (I, swapMI, swapM ).
It remains to show that for any simplex σ ∈ divMI, there
exists a Φ such that Φ(σ ) ∈ swapMI. Note that for any
σ ∈ divMI, the vertices in σ are still {v0,v1, . . . ,vn}, where
n + 1 is the total number of miners. Of course, the simplex
σ also contains all the higher-dimensional faces on the ver-
tices. Therefore, we need to show that for sufficiently large
M , the resulting simplex consists of all n + 1 vertices. As we
will show in the following lemma, this is indeed the case.
Lemma 4.9. For sufficiently largeM ∈ Z+, There is at least
one simplex τ ∈ swapMI such that dim(τ ) = dim(I).
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that there is no sim-
plex of dimension dim(I). Recall that in 2DP, there are only
two partitions of poolswith distinct number of miners. It fol-
lows that there is at least one “missing” vertexv in a specific
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pool that is not exchanged by any pool of the other partition
after M times of pool swaps. However, the swap operation
is defined in such a round-robin fashion that, as long asM is
larger than the pool size, all the vertices would be swapped.
Since we assume M is “sufficiently large,” it is larger than
the pool size also, thus leading to a contradiction. 
We are now ready to make the first main conclusion for
arbitrary-pool-size blockchains, as stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.10. If a blockchain has pools of only two dis-
tinct sizes, then it has an equilibrium.
Proof. If the blockchain does not has an equilibrium on
the pools, then according to Lemma 4.9 there cannot be a
protocol for the 2-set-agreement problem.However, it is known
that there exist algorithms solving the 2-set-agreement prob-
lem. 
4.5.3 KDP reduces to KSA, k ≥ 3. In contrast to the pre-
vious section, we will show that when the distinct pools are
larger than or equal to three, there does not exist an equilib-
rium. In the remainder of this section, we will assume k ≥ 3,
and both KDP and KSA assume the number of underlying
distinct sets/pools is at least three. Although the reduction
approach is implemented through simulation, we show that
this simulation can be constructed in the inverse direction:
any protocol solving a KSA implies a protocol in KDP. If
this is the case, and since we know that KSA’s protocol is
undecidable (again, assuming k ≥ 3), KDP cannot have an
equilibrium when k ≥ 3. As before, we start with construct-
ing the protocols for KSA and KDP, respectively.
Suppose a protocol (I,Pv ,Ξv ) solves the KDP problem.
Based on the discussion in §4.4, the protocol complex is a
union of k subcomplexes:
Pv =
⋃
1≤κ≤k
Pκv ,
where
dim(Pκv ) = |Iκ |, 1 ≤ κ ≤ k,
and Iκ is the κ-th partition—the set of |Iκ |-simplices in the
input complex I. While we do not know the operational
progress of Pv because it depends on the specific algorithm,
it is evident that the final complexmust have such an-simplex
that is disconnected from any other simplices because other-
wise some vertices would have ambiguous views of values—
not an equilibrium. Since the protocol complex is split into
k partitions, there must be k distinct n-simplices in Pv .
Now, we switch our focus to the protocol (I,Pr ,Ξr ) that
solves the KSA problem. It turns out that although the out-
put complex is different for k = 2 and k = 3, the protocol
complex remains unchanged: the input complex is still sub-
divided4 repeatedly. That is, the protocol can still be written
(I, divMI, divM ) for sufficiently largeM ∈ Z+.
We are ready to construct the simplicial mapΦ (cf.Def. 4.8)
Φ : Pv → div
MI.
We need to first map the k distinct n-simplices to simplices
in divmI for somem ≥ 1 that are disjoint. It turns out that
m = 1 can suffice: divI is capable to holdk suchn-simplices.
To demonstrate this, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.11. An n-simplex can be subdivided into (n + 1)
disjoint n-dimensional simplices.
Proof. We choose Chromatic subdivision, Ch(·), to prove
the claim. In the followingwe provide an informal definition
of Chromatic subdivision; a full explanation can be found
in [3]. A Chromatic subdivision recursively divides the n-
dimensional simplex’s k-skeletons, 0 ≤ k < n, into k pieces
plus the ϵ-areas. For a 1-dimensional line segment, the ϵ-
area is a central segment confined by two new vertices in-
between the original two endpoints. For a 2-dimensional tri-
angle, an inner triangle with its three vertices is “locally”
connected to the two new vertices in the 1-dimensional case
and the three vertices in the original triangle.
Letσ be an-dimensional simplex. For each facet of skeln−1σ ,
there must be (n − 1) new distinct vertices, which together
with the vertex in the central n-dimensional inner simplex
constitute a local n-simplex. Since there are exactly (n +
1) of (n − 1)-skeletons, we can find (n + 1) of these local
n-dimensional simplices, none of which is the original n-
simplex. Denote these simplices as {σ0,σ1, . . . ,σn}. Evidently,
dim(σk ) = n, 0 ≤ k ≤ n. For any σk , none of its vertices
is shared with others because n vertices are from its local
(n − 1)-skeleton and the (n + 1)-th vertex is from the cen-
tral inner n-simplex that is distinct for each local simplex.
Similarly, none of σk ’s higher skeletons are shared with any
other σk′ , k ′ , k , because these skeletons are encompassed
by a “larger” simplex contributed by the original vertices in
σ . Therefore, we have⋃
0≤k<k′≤n
σk ∩ σk′ = ∅,
which is claimed by the theorem. 
Now we are ready to state the main result of the solvabil-
ity of k-distinct-pool problem, k ≥ 3.
Theorem 4.12. If a blockchain has pools of at least three
distinct sizes, it does not have an equilibrium.
4In the literature, Barycentric subdivision, denoted by Bary(·), and Chron-
matic subdivision, denoted by Ch(·), are themost widely-used subdivisions.
Here, we ignored the details and simply say div(·).
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Proof. First, we show that there is a simulation from
KDP to KSA. According to Lemma 4.11, div1I generates
(n + 1) disjoint n-dimensional simplices5. It should be noted
that k < n, because otherwise we cannot have more parti-
tions than the total number of miners. It follows that div1I
has enough capacity to accommodate k distinct pools, each
of which cannot have more than (n + 1) vertices. It remains
to show that all the simplices in Pv other than the k sim-
plices of distinct pools can also be mapped to divMI. This
is a trivial task because we can always keep subdividing the
simplices that are not chosen to hold the k disjoint simplices
in div1I until we have enough capacity.
We know that KSA cannot be solved for k ≥ 3. Because
KDP can simulate KSA, KDP cannot be solved either. 
4.6 Blockchains with Arbitrary Pools
In this section, we summarize themain results for blockchains
with arbitrary pools and discuss the relations with game-
theoretical approaches.
If a blockchain has pools of only two distinct sizes, Theo-
rem 4.10 states that an equilibrium indeed exists. It should
be clear, however, that this claim says nothing about how
the protocol’s complexity looks like; the algorithm could be
polynomial, exponential, or NP-complete, which is not the
scope of this paper. In practice, a two-distinct-pool blockchain
network is, admittedly, rare. To this end, it is more inter-
esting to draw some conclusions on the case where more
than two pools are formed in the blockchain. Unfortunately,
Theorem 4.12 tells us that no equilibrium exists for these
more interesting cases. Of course, the impossibility result
for k ≥ 3 distinct pools, although somewhat discouraging, is
only based on the mainstream computingmodels nowadays.
The authors, in their very humble opinions, still hold high
hopes that future hardware and communication advances
plus possibly more advancedmathematical tools would lead
to equilibrium results.
Speaking of equilibria over groups of participants, we just
cannot skip the discussion on game theory. From a game-
theoretical point of view, the pooling strategies are aligned
with the so-called coalitional games. Unlike non-cooperative
games, where one is interested in the utility equilibrium for
individual participants, a coalitional game deals with the
utility of a coalition of participants—just like the pools of
miners in blockchains. More importantly, the well-known
Nash equilibrium that states an equilibrium always exists is
only applicable to non-cooperative games; the counterpart
equilibrium in coalitional games, namely core, is proven not
to always exist. In this sense, a large portion of this section
5As other algebraic operations, div1(·) is also simplified as div(·) in the
literature. Here we explicitly spell it out to emphasize its power.
just tries to achieve a stronger result than that in game the-
ory: when k ≥ 3, such a core does not exist for k-distinct-
pool blockchains. In coalitional game theory, there are a few
more relaxed equilibria than the core per se. For instance, a
bargaining set might be a practical replacement that implies
that a participant not in the core might still choose to stay in
its current coalition because its claims (for higher utility, for
example) can be countered. An extensive review of a coali-
tional game’s solution concepts can be found in [10]. For a
general introduction to game theory, see [4].
5 ADDITIONAL RELATEDWORK
We briefly review important work on game-theoretical tech-
niques and topological approaches in blockchains, distributed
computing, and computer security.
After the pioneering work [1] on the game-theoretical
analysis of blockchain pools, game-theoretical approaches
started to revive in computer security and blockchain com-
munities. In [8], game theory is used to model the interac-
tions between decoy router deployers and the censors. In [11],
authors studied miner’s behavior and blockchain’s status if
the miners’ incentive lies only on transaction fees. In [14], a
game-theoreticalmodelwas developed by considering Byzan-
tine failures for permissioned blockchains.
Topological approaches have a long story in distributed
computing and are recently used to design cross-blockchain
transactions [13], such as distributed cross-blockchain pro-
tocols [16]. In [15], a topological space is constructed to be
homeogeneous to the cross-blockchain transactions using
point-set topology. In [12], an algebraic-topological model
shows that a naive message-passing protocol cannot com-
plete a cross-blockchain transaction. In [9], point-set topol-
ogy was used to characterize the solvability of consensus
problems in distributed systems. Recent work on modeling
the data structure of blockchains through algebraic topol-
ogy appears at [5].
6 CONCLUSION
Our conventional wisdom on blockchain’s pooling equilib-
rium is limited: when the blockchain pools are abstracted as
a non-cooperative game, two pools can reach a Nash equi-
librium with a closed-form formula; an arbitrary number of
pools still exhibit an equilibrium as long as the pools have
an equal number of miners.
This paper studies the equilibrium in a blockchain of ar-
bitrary pools. First, we show that the equilibrium among q
identical pools, coinciding the result demonstrated by [1]
through game theory, can be constructed using a topological
approach. Second, if the pools are of different size, we show
that (i) if the blockchain’s pools exhibit two distinct sizes,
an equilibrium can be reached, and (ii) if the blockchain has
12
at least three distinct pool sizes, there does not exist an equi-
librium.
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